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Abstract
I study how monetary policy affects firms’ external financing decisions. More pre-
cisely, I study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to credit costs in a
general equilibrium macroeconomic model where firms issue corporate bonds or obtain
bank loans, and corporate bonds are not just stores of value but also serve a liquid-
ity role. The model shows that an increase in the nominal policy rate can lower the
borrowing cost in the corporate bond market, while increasing that in the bank loan
market, and I provide empirical evidence that supports this result. The model also
predicts that a higher nominal policy rate induces firms to substitute corporate bonds
for bank loans, which is supported by the existing empirical evidence. In the model,
the Friedman rule is suboptimal so that keeping the cost of holding liquidity at a pos-
itive level is socially optimal. The optimal policy rate is an increasing function of the
degree of corporate bond liquidity.
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1 Introduction
Central banks influence firms’ investment through controlling the nominal policy rate, which
then gets transmitted to the real rates at which firms borrow. I study this transmission
mechanism in a general equilibrium macroeconomic model where firms have two options
for external financing: they can issue corporate bonds or obtain bank loans. A theoretical
novelty of my model is that corporate bonds are not just stores of value but also serve
a liquidity role. The model delivers three predictions. First, an increase in the nominal
policy rate can lower the borrowing cost in the corporate bond market, while increasing
that in the bank loan market. This is in contrast with the common belief that all rates
in the economy move in the same direction in response to changes in monetary policy.1 I
provide empirical evidence that supports the result. Second, a higher nominal policy rate
induces firms to substitute corporate bonds for bank loans, and this result is supported by
the existing empirical evidence. Third, the Friedman rule is suboptimal so that keeping the
cost of holding liquidity at a positive level is socially optimal. The optimal policy rate is an
increasing function of the degree of corporate bond liquidity.
To provide a concrete concept of liquidity of corporate bonds, I employ a model in
the tradition of monetary-search theory, extended to include firms externally financing their
production. Consumers and firms trade in a decentralized market, where trade is bilateral,
credit is imperfect, and thus a medium of exchange is necessary. Agents allocate their wealth
between money and corporate bonds. Both can serve liquidity purposes, but only a fraction
of corporate bond holdings can be used towards trades. This assumption is meant to capture
the idea that, when in need of extra money, agents liquidate corporate bonds in a secondary
market, but due to frictions, trading delays, intermediation fees, etc., only a fraction of these
bonds can be sold. Hence, the fraction of bonds the agents can use is meant to capture the
degree of liquidity in the secondary market for those assets. Firms need to raise funds to
finance production, and they can do so whether by issuing corporate bonds or by obtaining
1Consider the following quote from Jones (2017)’s Macroeconomics textbook: “The Federal Reserve sets
. . . the federal funds rate, . . . effectively setting the rate[s] at which [firms] borrow . . . in financial markets
[emphasis added].” This quote implies that the Federal Reserve implements monetary policy changes by
targeting a single nominal rate but anticipates that these changes will be transmitted (symmetrically) to the
rates in all financial markets.
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a bank loan. Naturally, the liquidity properties of corporate bonds affect their equilibrium
price and, consequently, the issuance decision of firms.
Incorporating liquidity is the key to obtaining the main result of the paper. Thus, it
is important to justify that this choice is empirically relevant. I highlight the fact that the
U.S. corporate bond secondary market underwent a structural change during the early 2000s
with the introduction of the Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) that
mandated reporting transaction-related information in all over-the-counter (OTC) transac-
tions. Empirical evidence shows that the corporate bond secondary market liquidity has
improved substantially as a result of the increased transparency under the new system, and
that liquidity has become a significant component of the corporate bond premium since the
TRACE was implemented.2
In the model, the nominal policy rate affects the cost of issuing corporate bonds and
borrowing from a bank as follows. A higher nominal policy rate increases the opportunity
cost of holding money, reduces real money balances, increases the liquidity premium of
corporate bonds, and makes issuing corporate bonds less expensive. This pass-through
becomes stronger when the corporate bond secondary market is more liquid. The real loan
rates are determined in the OTC market for loans where firms and banks are matched and
bargain over the size and the interest rate of a loan. With an increase in the nominal policy
rate, the cost of holding money increases, agents carry less liquidity, and firms borrow less
from a bank since agents can afford less. As a result, the real loan rate increases because
it depends positively on the marginal benefit of a loan, and the latter decreases in the loan
size.
To empirically identify the channel through which the nominal policy rate affects the
liquidity premium of corporate bonds (which I label the liquidity premium channel of mon-
etary policy transmission), I use the fact that the introduction of the TRACE brought a
structural change in the liquidity of the corporate bond secondary market. The liquidity
2Two observations are in order. First, Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), Edwards,
Harris, and Piwowar (2007), and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) find that the secondary market
liquidity increased by 50–84% with the mandatory transaction reporting system. Second, Bao, Pan, and
Wang (2011) find that liquidity explains 47% to 60% of the time variation of aggregate bond spreads of
high-rated bonds, even larger than the variation that can be explained by credit risk. Also, He and Milbradt
(2014) find that liquidity accounts for 44% of credit spreads for investment-grade corporate bonds and 31%
for speculative-grade corporate bonds.
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premium channel is identified by the difference in the effect of an increase in the nominal
policy rate on the corporate bond premium between the pre- and the post-TRACE periods.
I employ the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) and the local projection approaches.
To ensure the results are not driven by other macro factors and to limit any potential re-
verse causality issues, I exploit the high-frequency identified surprises from Federal Funds
futures around the Federal Open Market Committee policy announcements as an external
instrument, following Gertler and Karadi (2015).
The empirical analysis shows that the liquidity premium of corporate bonds indeed
responds negatively to an increase in the nominal policy rate as the model predicts. Direct
liquidity measures such as bid-ask spreads and trading volume further confirm the result.
In the pre-TRACE period when the secondary market liquidity is low, a higher nominal
policy rate still increases the bond premium, which is consistent with Gertler and Karadi
(2015). However, surprisingly, in the post-TRACE period when the secondary market is
highly liquid, the liquidity premium channel turns out to be so strong that a higher nominal
policy rate decreases the bond premium. On the contrary, the real loan rates increase in the
nominal policy rate.
Another interesting prediction of the model is that an increase in the nominal policy rate
induces firms to substitute corporate bonds for bank loans. When firms have the option of
financing both through issuing corporate bonds and borrowing from a bank, firms with large
corporate bond issuance rely less on bank loans and thus can negotiate for a lower real loan
rate. A higher nominal policy rate makes issuing corporate bonds less expensive, allowing
firms to issue more corporate bonds for the strategic purpose of lowering their financing costs.
Becker and Ivashina (2014) provide direct empirical support for this theoretical finding.
Lastly, I use the model to study optimal monetary policy for the period, such as the
post-TRACE period, when the liquidity premium channel of monetary policy transmission is
dominant in the response of the bond premium to the nominal policy rate. A common result
in monetary theory is that an increase in the nominal policy rate hurts welfare: a higher
nominal policy rate increases the opportunity cost of holding liquidity, induces agents to
carry less liquidity, and reduces the quantity of goods they can afford. In my model, however,
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the Friedman rule—implementing zero nominal policy rate—is suboptimal.3 The intuition
behind the suboptimality of the Friedman rule is as follows. Assume that the nominal policy
rate is currently low, so that the borrowing cost in the corporate bond market is high, while
that in the bank loan market is low. When meeting a firm for trade, agents face risk: they
can meet a firm that obtained a loan from a bank and have large production capacity, or
a firm that financed only by issuing corporate bonds and have small production capacity.
Increasing the nominal policy rate makes issuing corporate bonds cheaper and borrowing
from a bank more expensive, thereby reducing the risk agents face and increasing welfare.
The optimal nominal policy rate depends on the corporate bond secondary market liquidity
and the distribution of firms along their ways of financing. The more liquid the corporate
bond secondary market, or the more firms financing through issuing corporate bonds, the
higher the optimal policy rate.
Related literature. A collection of empirical papers uses monetary policy as a source of
aggregate variation and studies its effect on the firm-side of the economy. One strand of
such literature examines firms’ heterogeneous responses in their investment, interpreting the
results as an indication of the presence of financial frictions. The heterogeneity depends
on the firms’ various characteristics such as cash flows (Oliner and Rudebusch (1992)), size
(Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)), liquid asset holdings
(Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Jeenas (2019)), default risk (Ottonello and Winberry
(2020)), and age/dividend payouts (Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel, and Surico (2019)). This
paper contributes to the literature by studying the heterogeneity in the responses of different
financial markets for firms’ external financing, including the corporate bond and the bank
loan markets, which implies that firms will respond differently depending on their access to
markets.
Another related empirical literature is the one that examines the relationship between
monetary policy and the liquidity premium of liquid assets. Nagel (2016) and Drechsler,
3A negative relationship between the nominal policy rate and welfare characterizes a large class of
monetary models, including Lagos and Wright (2005) and the majority of models that build upon their
framework. However, there are exceptions to this rule, especially models with search externality. Later,
when I review the related literature, I provide a more detailed discussion of exceptions to this result, and
I claim that the channel through which my model can deliver a positive relationship between the nominal
policy rate and welfare has not been highlighted before.
4
Savov, and Schnabl (2018) provide empirical evidence that the liquidity premium of Trea-
suries is positively associated with the short-term interest rates. The rationale behind it
is the exact same as the one considered in this paper: the short-term interest rates imply
a higher opportunity cost of holding money and hence a higher premium for the liquidity
service benefits of assets that can be substitutes for money. This paper complements the
literature by providing evidence that a similar relationship between monetary policy and the
liquidity premium holds also for corporate bonds.4
This paper also contributes to the empirical literature that investigates the effect of the
introduction of the TRACE to the corporate bond secondary market. A series of papers, such
as Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007),
Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007), and Asquith, Covert, and Pathak (2013), study the
impact of the mandatory transaction reporting through the TRACE on the trading costs
and the liquidity of the corporate bond secondary market. This paper contributes to the
literature by looking at the impact of the introduction of the TRACE on the response of the
corporate bond market to monetary policy.
Also related is the literature that studies firms’ financing choices and the composition of
credit, which includes for instance Denis and Mihov (2003), Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012),
Becker and Ivashina (2014), and Schwert (2018). This paper is especially relevant to Becker
and Ivashina (2014). One of the theoretical findings of this paper is that firms switch from
loans to bonds following an increase in the nominal policy rate. Becker and Ivashina (2014)
provide direct empirical support for this finding.
The model in this paper builds on the New Monetarist framework, recent advances in
monetary economics, as surveyed in Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright (2017) and Nosal and
Rocheteau (2017). The consumer-side of the model is based on Lagos and Wright (2005).
In the model, corporate bonds have a liquidity premium due to the liquidity service they
provide, and the monetary policy affects the costs of holding money and in turn the price
of corporate bonds through their liquidity premium, following Geromichalos, Licari, and
Suárez-Lledó (2007), Lagos (2011), Nosal and Rocheteau (2012), Andolfatto, Berentsen, and
4Lagos and Zhang (2020) provide an empirical study on the equity market.
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Waller (2013), and Hu and Rocheteau (2015).5
Another paper that studies how monetary policy affects corporate finance is Rocheteau,
Wright, and Zhang (2018). While in their paper firms finance investment by internal financ-
ing or bank loans, the firm-side of the model in this paper focuses solely on external financing,
in particular corporate bond issues and bank loans.6 In addition, this paper integrates the
consumer- and the firm-sides and studies how they interact with each other. By doing so, the
supply of corporate bonds becomes endogenous, instead of being supplied at an exogenous
level. Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016b) also endogenize the supply of assets, but in
their model asset issuers and sellers who produce consumption goods are different agents.
On the other hand, in this paper firms issue bonds to finance their production.
As for the suboptimality of the Friedman rule, there exist generally two classes of
models where positive costs of holding money can be welfare improving.7 One is the models
where inflation has distributive effects (see for example Molico (2006) and Rocheteau, Weill,
and Wong (2019)). The other is the models with free entry to search (see for example
Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Rocheteau, and Shi (2007)). When there is
search externality, the Friedman rule is optimal if and only if the Hosios (1990) condition is
satisfied. When the Hosios (1990) condition does not hold, a deviation from the Friedman
rule can be optimal since it can adjust the inefficiently large or small number of agents
who are in search. This paper provides a new rationale for why the Friedman rule can be
suboptimal, which is due to the heterogeneity in the effect of monetary policy across different
financing sources.
Definitions of premiums. This paper defines the liquidity premium and the bond premium
as follows. The liquidity premium is a price premium that investors are willing to pay for
the liquidity service that assets provide. It is defined as the price of an asset minus the price
5While in this paper the liquidity property of assets is direct in the sense that they serve as a medium of
exchange or collateral and thus help to facilitate trade in frictional decentralized markets for goods, it can
be microfounded by introducing secondary markets where agents can liquidate assets for money or by using
information theory. See Berentsen, Huber, and Marchesiani (2014, 2016), Han (2015), Geromichalos and
Herrenbrueck (2016a, 2016b, 2017), Geromichalos, Herrenbrueck, and Salyer (2016), Mattesini and Nosal
(2016), Herrenbrueck and Geromichalos (2017), Herrenbrueck (2019a), and Madison (2019) for the examples
for the former, and Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2018) for the latter.
6The OTC market for bank loans in this paper follows Rocheteau, Wright, and Zhang (2018).
7For an exhaustive list of the papers in which a deviation from the Friedman rule can be optimal, see
Section 6.9 of Nosal and Rocheteau (2017).
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if the asset did not provide any liquidity service. This definition follows the New Monetarist
literature (see Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright (2017) and Nosal and Rocheteau (2017) for
surveys). The liquidity premium defined in this way moves in the same direction as that in
Nagel (2016) and Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018), who define the liquidity premium in
yield, as the yield if an asset did not provide any liquidity service minus the yield of the asset.
The definition of the bond premium follows Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012), who defines the
bond premium as the yield of a bond minus the yield associated with a price that equals
the net present value of the cash flows, or the fundamental value, of the bond. Under these
definitions, the liquidity premium and the bond premium are negatively correlated.
Structure of the paper. Section 2 presents the environment of the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the equilibrium of the model and examines the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy to credit costs. Section 4 provides empirical analysis and evidence that supports such
mechanism. Section 5 analyzes how monetary policy affects the composition of firms’ credit.
Section 6 studies optimal monetary policy. Section 7 concludes. The online appendices con-
tain a theory appendix and an appendix that explains data sources and includes additional
figures for robustness checks.
2 The Model
The model builds on Lagos and Wright (2005) and introduces firms externally financing their
production. Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period is divided into two subpe-
riods. In the first subperiod, there is a decentralized market (DM) where a specialized good
is traded. In the second subperiod, three markets open in order: a frictionless centralized
market (CM) where agents settle liabilities and trade a consumption good and assets; an
over-the-counter (OTC) market for bank loans, as in Rocheteau, Wright, and Zhang (2018);
and a competitive market for intermediate goods. The consumption good in the CM is taken
as the numeraire.
There are four agents: firms, intermediate good suppliers, banks, and consumers. Firms
produce special goods (hereafter, DM goods) in the DM and sell them to consumers. To
produce the DM goods, they need to purchase intermediate goods from the intermediate
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good suppliers, and, to do so, they need to externally finance. The intermediate good
suppliers (hereafter, suppliers) can produce intermediate goods and provide them to firms.
Bank loans are one of the ways of external financing, and banks do loan services for firms.
Consumers buy the DM goods from firms in the DM and consume them. The measure of
firms and consumers is 1. The measure of banks is the same as that of firms borrowing from
a bank. The measure of suppliers is irrelevant due to constant returns to scale (CRS) in
their production.
Agents live forever, except for firms that live one period. Firms are born in the second
subperiod and die next period in the second subperiod after settlement. Agents discount
across periods, but not subperiods, at rate β ∈ (0, 1). All agents have a linear preference
over the numeraire, c, where c > 0 is interpreted as consumption of the numeraire and c < 0
as production. Additionally, consumers, who consume the DM goods in the first subperiod
in the DM, derive utility, u(q), where q is the consumption of the DM goods. u is twice
continuously differentiable, u(0) = 0, u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. Firms
can transform intermediate goods acquired from suppliers into the DM goods with linear
technology.8 Suppliers can produce intermediate goods at unit cost.
Firms, born in the second subperiod, are in need of intermediate goods to produce
the DM goods in the following first subperiod. When purchasing intermediate goods from
suppliers, firms need to pay in numeraire, and firms that are just born are assumed not to be
able to produce numeraire goods. Firms can acquire numeraire goods either by obtaining a
loan from a bank or by issuing one-period real corporate bonds that yield a unit of numeraire
in the next second subperiod. For the moment, it is assumed that the measure 1−λ ∈ (0, 1)
of firms finance by borrowing from a bank, while the measure λ of firms finance by issuing
corporate bonds.9 The issuance decision of firms endogenously determines the supply of
corporate bonds. On the demand side of the corporate bond market are consumers. Banks
are not allowed to hold corporate bonds.
8This is without loss of generality, and all go through with a concave production function. Assume that,
with k amount of intermediate goods, firms can produce f(k) amount of the DM goods, where f is twice
continuously differentiable, f(0) = 0, f ′(0) = ∞, f ′(∞) = 0, f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. This in turn means that, to
produce q amount of the DM goods, a firm needs f−1(q) amount of intermediate goods. f−1 is effectively a
convex cost function, and all remaining analysis is the same.














Figure 1. The environment of the model
The other asset traded in the CM, besides corporate bonds, is money. Monetary author-
ity controls the money supply, and the supply evolves according to Mt+1 = (1+π)Mt, where
π is the rate of monetary expansion (or contraction if π < 0) implemented by lump-sum
transfers to (or taxes on) consumers at the beginning of the second subperiod. In a station-
ary equilibrium, π is also the inflation rate. i ≡ (1 + π)/β − 1 represents the cost of holding
money and, it is the nominal interest rate on an illiquid bond (if such bond were introduced).
An equilibrium exists for i > 0, or π > β − 1, and the Friedman rule is considered as i→ 0,
or π → β − 1.
In the DM, firms produce the DM goods using intermediate goods and sell them to
consumers. Trade in the DM is bilateral and agents are anonymous and lack commitment.
Thus, trade has to be quid pro quo and necessitates a medium of exchange. Both money
and corporate bonds can play this role. But corporate bonds are partially liquid, and only a
fraction χ ∈ (0, 1] can be used as payment. Consumers meet firms randomly and negotiate
over the terms of trade. All consumers match with a firm. The surplus generated within
a match is split according to Kalai’s proportional bargaining solution, and the consumer’s
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bargaining power is θ ∈ (0, 1). In the OTC market for loans, all firms match with a bank.
Terms of a loan contract are determined through generalized Nash bargaining between a
firm and a bank, and the banks’ bargaining power is η ∈ (0, 1).
The environment of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
3 Analysis of the Model
3.1 Value Functions
Consider a consumer in the second subperiod who carries to the CM financial wealth w
denominated in numeraire and chooses a portfolio of real balances (units of money in terms
of numeraire) and corporate bonds to bring to the DM. The value function of the consumer
in the CM is
WC(w) = max
c,m̂≥0,â≥0
c+ βV C(m̂, â) s.t. c+ (1 + π)m̂+ ψâ = w + T, (1)
where WC and V C are the value functions of a consumer in the second and the first sub-
periods, respectively, c is consumption (or production if c < 0) of numeraire goods, m̂ is
real balances (units of money in terms of numeraire), â is the amount of corporate bonds
purchased, ψ is the price of corporate bonds, and T is the lump-sum transfer in terms of
numeraire (or taxes if T < 0). Since the rate of return on money is 1/(1 + π), a consumer
accumulates (1 + π)m̂ of real balances this period to hold m̂ at the start of the next period.
Eliminating c using the constraint, the value function reduces to
WC(w) = w + T + max
m̂≥0,â≥0
{−(1 + π)m̂− ψâ+ βV C(m̂, â)}, (2)
which shows that WC is linear in w and that the choice of (m̂, â) is independent of w. In the
following first subperiod, the consumer randomly matches with a firm and trades the DM
goods. In the DM, the consumer bargains with a firm over how many DM goods to purchase
from the firm, q, and how much financial wealth to transfer to the firm in return for the DM
goods, p. With probability 1−λ, the consumer will match with a firm that finances through
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borrowing from a bank, and the terms of trade with such firm are denoted by (qL, pL). With
probability λ, the consumer will match with a firm that finances through issuing corporate
bonds, and the terms of trade with such firm are denoted by (qB, pB). When purchasing q
amount of the DM goods, the consumer derives u(q) of utility from consuming them. After
paying p amount of financial wealth to a firm in exchange for the DM goods purchased, the
consumer brings m̂+ â−p amount of leftover financial wealth to the CM. The value function
of a consumer who brings m̂ amount of real balances and â amount of corporate bonds to
the DM is











which, using the linearity of WC, reduces to
V C(m̂, â) = (1− λ) [u(qL)− pL] + λ [u(qB)− pB] +W
C(m̂+ â). (4)
Next consider the value function of an intermediate good supplier in the second subpe-
riod:
W S = max
c,k≥0
c+ βW S s.t. c+ k = pkk, (5)
where k is the amount of intermediate goods produced and pk is their price. Suppliers do
not trade in the DM and do not carry any money or corporate bonds due to the cost of
holding money and because corporate bonds will be priced at the liquidity premium. In the
competitive market for intermediate goods that comes after the CM, suppliers choose the
amount of intermediate goods, k, to produce at a linear cost taking its price, pk, as given. A
supplier finds k that maximizes −k+pkk. If the intermediate goods market is active, pk = 1.
In the OTC market for loans, a bank provides a loan to a firm. The terms of a loan
contract, denoted by (k, rℓ), are determined through bargaining between a firm and a bank:
a firm borrows k amount of numeraire from a bank and pays back (1 + rℓ)k amount of
numeraire in the next second subperiod. The value function of a bank in the CM with
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financial wealth w denominated in numeraire and a loan contract (k, rℓ) is
WB(w) = max
c
c+ βWB((1 + rℓ)k) s.t. c+ k = w. (6)
The constraint can be written as k = w − c, and this represents the balance sheet of the
bank. It indicates that the amount of a loan given to a firm, k, is covered by the financial
wealth of the bank, w− c, which can be thought of as bank capital. Eliminating c using the
constraint, the value function reduces to WB(w) = w − k + βWB((1 + rℓ)k).
Now consider a firm in the second subperiod that is just born and finances through bor-
rowing from a bank under the terms of a loan contract (k, rℓ). With k amount of numeraire
borrowed from a bank, the firm purchases k amount of intermediate goods from suppliers at
price pk = 1. In the following first subperiod, the firm matches with a consumer and trade
the DM goods, and the terms of trade are denoted by (qL, pL). After trading in the DM, the
firm brings k − qL of leftover intermediate goods and pL of financial wealth to the CM and
needs to pay back (1 + rℓ)k units of numeraire to the bank. The value function in the first
subperiod of a firm with a loan contract (k, rℓ) is
V F (k, (1 + rℓ)k) = W
F (k − qL, pL, (1 + rℓ)k), (7)
where V F and W F are the value functions of a firm in the first and the second subperiods,
respectively. The value function of a firm in the second subperiod after trading in the DM is
W F (k − qL, pL, (1 + rℓ)k) = max
c
c s.t. c = k − qL + pL − (1 + rℓ)k, (8)
which simply reduces to W F (k − qL, pL, (1 + rℓ)k) = k − qL + pL − (1 + rℓ)k.
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A firm that finances through issuing corporate bonds first decides the amount of cor-
porate bonds to issue, Â, taking their price ψ in the CM as given. With ψÂ amount of
numeraire acquired by issuing corporate bonds, the firm purchases intermediate goods from
10It is assumed that the firm can use the leftover intermediate goods to produce numeraire goods at unit
cost, in case the firm did not use all the intermediate goods it held to produce the DM goods. Allowing
a firm to be able to use the leftover intermediate goods enters as an outside option for firms in bargaining
over the terms of DM trade, and this technology is not used in equilibrium. This assumption is just for
simplifying the exposition.
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suppliers at price pk = 1. In the following first subperiod, the firm matches with a consumer
and trade the DM goods, and the terms of trade are denoted by (qB, pB). After trading in
the DM, the firm brings ψÂ − qB of leftover intermediate goods and pB of financial wealth
to the CM and needs to pay Â units of numeraire to the consumers who hold the corporate
bonds. The value function in the first subperiod of a firm that issued Â amount of corporate
bonds in the previous second subperiod at price ψ is
V F (ψÂ, Â) = W F (ψÂ− qB, pB, Â). (9)
The value function of a firm in the second subperiod after trading in the DM is
W F (ψÂ− qB, pB, Â) = max
c
c s.t. c = ψÂ− qB + pB − Â, (10)
which simply reduces to W F (ψÂ − qB, pB, Â) = ψÂ − qB + pB − Â. Using the linearity of




βV F (ψÂ, Â) = max
Â≥0
β{(pB − qB)− (1− ψ)Â}. (11)
3.2 Terms of Trade
Consider a meeting in the DM between a consumer who carries m amount of real balances
and a amount of corporate bonds and a firm that brings k amount of intermediate goods.
The two parties bargain over the quantity of the DM goods to trade, q, and the amount of
financial wealth for the consumer to transfer to the firm, p. Corporate bonds are partially
liquid, and only a fraction χ ∈ (0, 1] can be used as a medium of exchange. Thus, the
maximum amount of financial wealth that the consumer can use for trade is m + χa. The
firm can produce the DM goods with a linear technology up to k. Trade is as a result
subject to both the consumer’s liquidity and the firm’s capacity constraints: p ≤ m + χa
and q ≤ k. The total surplus generated within a meeting is split according to Kalai’s
proportional bargaining solution, and the consumer’s bargaining power is θ ∈ (0, 1). The
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consumer’s continuation value with trade is u(q) +WC(m + a − p): the consumer derives
u(q) of utility from consuming q amount of the DM goods and brings m + a − p amount
of leftover financial wealth to the CM after transferring p amount of financial wealth to the
firm as a payment. The consumer’s continuation value without trade is WC(m + a). Thus,
the consumer’s surplus is u(q) +WC(m + a − p) −WC(m + a), which, using the linearity
of WC, reduces to u(q) − p. The firm’s continuation value with trade is W F (k − q, p, · ),
where the last argument is the liabilities that the firm needs to pay back in the subsequent
second subperiod to either consumers (who hold the corporate bonds if the firm financed
through issuing corporate bonds) or a bank (according to a loan contract if the firm financed
through a bank loan). The firm brings k − q amount of leftover intermediate goods after
producing q amount of DM goods with a linear technology and p amount of financial wealth
that it received from the consumer as a payment. The firm’s continuation value without
trade is W F (k, 0, · ). Thus, the firm’s surplus is W F (k− q, p, · )−W F (k, 0, · ), which, using
the linearity of W F, reduces to p− q. The total surplus is the sum of the consumer’s surplus
and the firm’s surplus and equals u(q)− q. The bargaining solution is
p = v(q) ≡ (1− θ)u(q) + θq, v′(q) > 0, (12)
q = min{v−1(m+ χa), k}. (13)
The consumer must transfer p = v(q) amount of financial wealth to the firm to get q amount
of the DM goods, and a larger amount of financial wealth needs to be transferred to purchase
a larger amount of the DM goods. p solves u(q)−p = θ(u(q)− q) or p− q = (1−θ)(u(q)− q)
so that the consumer’s surplus, u(q) − p, becomes θ share of the total surplus, u(q) − q,
and that the firm’s surplus, p − q, becomes 1 − θ share of the total surplus. The first best
solution to the bargaining problem that maximizes the total surplus is denoted by (p∗, q∗),
where p∗ = v(q∗) and q∗ satisfies u′(q∗) = 1. With m + χa amount of financial wealth that
can be used for trade, the consumer can buy up to v−1(m + χa) amount of the DM goods.
With k amount of intermediate goods in hand, the firm can produce up to k amount of the
DM goods. In equilibrium, m + χa ≤ v(q∗) and k ≤ q∗ hold: the consumer will not want
to bring more financial wealth than she needs to buy q∗ amount of the DM goods, and the
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firm will not want to bring more intermediate goods than it needs to produce q∗ amount of
the DM goods. Observing that the total surplus u(q) − q increases in q until q = q∗, the
shorter side between the consumer’s liquidity position and the firm’s capacity determines
the bargaining solution. Thus, q is given by the minimum between v−1(m+ χa) and k.
3.3 Loan Contract
Consider a meeting in the OTC market for loans in the second subperiod between a bank
with w amount of bank capital that can be lent as a loan and a firm that finances through
borrowing from a bank. The two parties bargain over the amount of numeraire that the
bank lends to the firm, k, and the amount of numeraire that the firm needs to repay to the
bank in the next second subperiod, (1 + rℓ)k, where rℓ is the real lending rate. Terms of a
loan contract are determined through generalized Nash bargaining between the firm and the
bank, and the bank’s bargaining power is η ∈ (0, 1). The firm’s continuation value with a
loan contract (k, rℓ) is βV
F (k, (1 + rℓ)k), and the firm’s continuation value without a loan
contract is βV F (0, 0). Thus, the firm’s surplus is β[V F (k, (1+rℓ)k)−V
F (0, 0)], which, using
(7) and the linearity ofW F, reduces to β[pL−qL−rℓk]. Using (12) and (13), it further reduces
to β[(1− θ)(u(qL)− qL)− rℓk], where qL = min{v
−1(m̃+χã), k} when the firm believes that
a consumer will carry m̃ amount of real balances and ã amount of corporate bonds to the
DM. The bank’s continuation value with a loan contract (k, rℓ) is βW
B((1 + rℓ)k + w − k),
and the bank’s continuation value without a loan contract is βWB(w). Thus, the bank’s
surplus is β[WB((1 + rℓ)k + w − k)−W
B(w)], which, using the linearity of WB, reduces to
βrℓk.









11It is assumed that a bank can use its bank capital (which is in numeraire) that was not lent in the
following way. Assume that a bank lent only k < w amount to a firm and has w − k amount of leftover
numeraire in hand. It will then go to the intermediate goods market, exchange the leftover nuemraire with
intermediate goods, and, in the next period CM, produce numeraire goods using the intermediate goods
at unit cost. I assumed that banks have access to this technology. This technology is not used on the
equilibrium path, and it is just for simplifying the exposition.
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Since the firm will not want to borrow more than it needs to produce the amount of the DM









The solution is such that k maximizes the total surplus, (1 − θ)(u(k) − k), subject to k ≤
v−1(m̃+χã). Since u(k)−k increases in k until k = q∗, k = min{v−1(m̃+χã), q∗}. Observing
that v−1(m̃+ χã) ≤ q∗ holds in equilibrium, the solution is given by






First start with the optimal behavior of a firm that finances through issuing corporate
bonds. From (10), at a given price ψ, the firm chooses the amount of corporate bonds to
issue, A ≥ 0, that maximizes (pB − qB) − (1 − ψ)A, which, using (12) and (13), reduces to
(1 − θ)(u(qB) − qB) − (1 − ψ)A, where qB = min{v
−1(m̃ + χã), ψA} when believing that
a consumer will carry m̃ amount of real balances and ã amount of corporate bonds to the
DM. An equilibrium exists when 1 − ψ > 0, or ψ < 1, that is, when borrowing through
the corporate bond market is costly. Since the firm will not want to bring more capital to
the DM than it needs to produce the amount of the DM goods that a consumer can afford,
v−1(m̃+ χã), the maximization problem becomes
max
0≤A≤v−1(m̃+χã)/ψ
{(1− θ)(u(ψA)− ψA)− (1− ψ)A}. (18)
The solution describes the optimal corporate bond issuance decision of the firm, or the supply
of corporate bonds, and is given by





− 1 = (1− θ)(u′(ψĀ)− 1). (20)









which is an increasing function of ψ, the price of the corporate bonds. The higher price
makes financing through issuing corporate bonds less expensive and thus allows firms to
raise more funds.
Now consider the optimal behavior of a consumer who chooses a portfolio of real balances
and corporate bonds. From (2), the consumer chooses the amount of real balances, m, and
the amount of corporate bonds, a, that maximize −(1+π)m−ψa+βV C(m, a), which, using




− (1 + π)m− ψa+ βm+ βa+ β(1− λ)[u(qL)− pL] + βλ[u(qB)− pB]
}
. (22)
Here I restrict attention to the case where the price of the corporate bonds, ψ, is not so high
that firms will not be able to bring enough amount of intermediate goods to the DM to meet
the consumers’ demand.12 In this case, qB = ψĀ < v
−1(m + χa), and qL = v
−1(m + χa)




− (1 + π)m− ψa+ βm+ βa+ β(1− λ)
[





The optimal behavior of the consumer is given by
1 + π = β
{







12This essentially means that i is assumed to be not too high (Assumption 1 given below). Online











where the first is the consumer’s money demand and the second is the consumer’s bond
demand. These expressions simplify to
i = (1− λ)L(m+ χa), (26)
ψ = β(1 + χi). (27)
where i ≡ (1 + π)/β − 1 and L(·) ≡ u′(v−1(·))/v′(v−1(·))− 1 with L′(·) < 0.
The following assumption ensures that the price of the corporate bonds is not too high
so that financing through corporate bonds is expensive and that firms financing through
corporate bonds are not able to satisfy the consumer’s demand in the DM.
Assumption 1. i < ι ≡
(1− λ)(1− β)θ
1− θ + (1− λ)βθχ
.
Notice that this assumption implies that i < (1− β)/(βχ) so that ψ < 1 and thus also
guarantees a well-defined bond supply function.
The equilibrium is defined as below.
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium of the economy corresponds to a constant sequence
(qL, qB,m, a,A,ψ, k, rℓ), where qL is the DM goods traded between a consumer and a firm
that finances through borrowing from a bank, qB is the DM goods traded between a consumer
and a firm that finances through issuing corporate bonds, m is the consumer’s real balance
holdings, a is the consumer’s corporate bond holdings, A is the supply of corporate bonds
issued by firms, ψ is the price of corporate bonds, k is the size of a loan that a bank lends to













1− β(1 + χi)






ψ = β(1 + χi), (30)
A = qB/ψ, (31)
a = λA, (32)
m = v(qL)− χa, (33)
and (k, rℓ) satisfy







v(·) = (1− θ)u(·) + θ · , v′(·) > 0, (36)
L(·) = u′(v−1(·))/v′(v−1(·))− 1, L′(·) < 0. (37)
3.5 Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy to Credit Costs
This section focuses on how monetary policy influences the cost of financing that in turn
affects economic activity. First start with the price of the corporate bonds. From (30),
∂ψ/∂i > 0. The nominal policy rate i affects the price of the corporate bonds through the
cost of holding money (which equals i itself) and the liquidity premium of the corporate
bonds (which equals LP ≡ χi in (30)). As i increases, the rate of return on money decreases,
and the real balances decrease. Due to less prevalent liquidity in the economy, the role of
the corporate bonds as a medium of exchange increases, which in turn leads to an increase
in the liquidity premium of the corporate bonds.
I define the excess bond premium following Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012), who compute
the excess bond premium of a corporate bond as a difference between the yield of the
corporate bond and the yield calculated using a price that equals the net present value of
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the cash flows, or the fundamental value, of the corporate bond.13 For the one-period real
corporate bond, the net present value of its cash flows is β, and the corresponding nominal
yield is i ≡ (1 + π)/β − 1, while the nominal yield of the corporate bond is (1 + π)/ψ − 1.












χ(1 + i+ i(1 + χi))
(1 + χi)2
< 0. (39)
The negative impact of the nominal policy rate on the excess bond premium in this model
comes through the effect of the nominal policy rate on the liquidity premium: the higher
liquidity premium implies the smaller excess bond premium. I label this mechanism the














1 + i(2− χ)
(1 + χi)3
> 0, (40)
which means that the more liquid the corporate bond market, or the higher the degree of
corporate bond liquidity, the stronger the liquidity premium channel.
Next consider how the nominal policy rate passes through to the real lending rate for
loans. ∂rℓ/∂k < 0 from (35), ∂k/∂(m+ χa) > 0 from (34) and (36), and ∂(m+ χa)/∂i < 0
from (26) and (37). These together imply ∂rℓ/∂i > 0. From (16), with an increase in the
nominal policy rate, the cost of holding money increases, agents carry less liquidity, and
firms borrow less from a bank since agents can afford less. As a result, as can be seen from
(17), the real loan rate increases because it depends positively on the marginal benefit of a
loan, and the latter decreases in the loan size. The following proposition summarizes the
discussion.
13Gilchrist and Zakraǰsek (2012) define this difference as the credit spread, and define the excess bond
premium as the credit spread after removing the component due to default risk. Since the corporate bonds
in this model do not default, the credit spread equals the excess bond premium.
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Proposition 1. As the nominal policy rate increases, the liquidity premium of corporate
bonds increases, the excess bond premium decreases, and the effect of the nominal policy on
the excess bond premium becomes stronger as the corporate bond secondary market becomes
more liquid. In addition, a higher nominal policy rate implies a higher price of corporate













3.6 Nominal Policy Rate
In the next section, I turn to the data and provide empirical evidence that supports the
monetary policy transmission mechanism of the model summarized in Proposition 1. In the
analysis of the model, as a nominal policy rate, I have used i, a nominal interest rate on
a perfectly illiquid bond. However, in the empirical analysis, following the literature, I am
going to use the Treasury rate as the nominal policy rate. The Treasuries are obviously
considered highly liquid and thus their rate is a different object than i. In this subsection,
before turning to the empirical analysis, I connect i and the Treasury rate, a nominal interest
rate on a liquid government bond. To do so, assume that there are government bonds supplied
at a fixed amount. Denote the nominal interest rate on the government bonds by ig. Also,
assume that those government bonds are partially liquid, and only a fraction χg ∈ (0, 1] can
be used for liquidity purposes. In this case, in equilibrium, the nominal interest rate on the








That is, there is a one-to-one positive relationship between i and ig. Hence, in the following
empirical exercise, I adopt the Treasury rate as the policy rate.14
14Although theoretically it is possible to generate a negative relationship between i and ig when one
microfounds the asset secondary market in a rigorous way (see Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2017) for
instance), Herrenbrueck (2019b) empirically shows that, except for Volcker’s disinflation period in his first
term (1981–1982), the estimated i and the nominal interest rate on the public debt are positively correlated.
This gives me another justification for using the Treasury rate as the policy rate for the empirical analysis,
given that the sample period of the dataset that I use starts from 1990.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Structural Change in the Corporate Bond Market
4.1.1 Introduction of the TRACE and Its Impact on the Market Liquidity
Corporate bonds are traded between agents in the secondary market, which is a dealer-
oriented over-the-counter (OTC) market. The trading environment of the U.S. corporate
bond secondary market used to be highly opaque for decades. Transaction-related informa-
tion, such as prices and volumes at which corporate bonds were traded, was available only
to the parties involved in the transactions. This caused an asymmetric information prob-
lem between dealers and traders, and dealers extracted rents from less-informed customers.
These rent-seeking behaviors of dealers incurred traders a huge amount of trading costs and
made the market illiquid.15
However, the scene changed dramatically when the Transaction Reporting and Compli-
ance Engine (TRACE) was introduced to the U.S. corporate bond market, and many of the
issues that were hindering the market from being liquid were resolved. With the approval of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), beginning on July 1, 2002, the National As-
sociation of Security Dealers (NASD) (which is currently the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA)) started to require dealers to report transaction-related information on
all over-the-counter trades for publicly issued corporate bonds, such as the identification of
traded bonds, the date and the time of execution, trade size, trade price, yields, and whether
the dealers bought or sold in the transaction. The TRACE is the platform that the NASD
developed to facilitate this mandatory reporting.
The amount of the information made public and the timeliness of reporting under the
new system were phased in over time from July 1, 2002 to January 9, 2006 based on the
size and the credit rating of the bonds. On July 1, 2002, trades in investment-grade cor-
porate bonds with an issuance size of $1 billion or greater, as well as 50 representative
non-investment-grade bonds, began to be disseminated to the public. During 2003, trades
in 120 selected BBB-rated bonds (on April 14, 2003) and higher-rated bonds (on March 3,
15Biais and Green (2019) provide detailed discussion on how the opaque transaction environment deteri-
orated the corporate bond secondary market in terms of trading costs and the market liquidity.
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2003) with initial issue sizes over $100 million began to be disseminated to the public. On
February 7, 2005, data began to be disseminated for all but newly issued or lightly traded
bonds. By January 9, 2006, trades in all publicly issued bonds were disseminated to the
public. In addition, the timeliness with which dealers were required to report trades was
tightened in stages. Upon the introduction of TRACE, dealers had 75 minutes to report
trades. This was reduced on October 1, 2003, to a reporting time of 45 minutes, and on Oc-
tober 1, 2004, to 30 minutes. Since July 1, 2005, dealers have been required to report trades
within 15 minutes. Since January 9, 2006, reports have had to be made immediately.16
Empirical evidence shows that the post-trade transparency due to the introduction of the
TRACE reduced dealers’ information advantage relative to traders, led to a significant drop
in trading costs, and substantially improved the market liquidity. For example, three papers,
Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007),
and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) examine how the market liquidity, measured in
bid-ask spreads, changed around the period when the TRACE was implemented, and find
that the secondary market liquidity increased by 50–84% with the mandatory transaction
reporting system. The empirical literature documents this substantial improvement in the
market liquidity with the introduction of the TRACE as a structural change in the U.S.
corporate bond market.
4.1.2 Hypotheses
The increased liquidity of the corporate bond secondary market with the introduction of the
TRACE can be interpreted as an increase in χ in the model, the fraction of corporate bond
holdings that can be used towards trades for liquidity purposes, which essentially is capturing
the degree of the secondary market liquidity. This in turn implies that, as Proposition 1
states, the liquidity premium channel of monetary policy transmission must be stronger in
the period after the TRACE was implemented.
My model was focusing mainly on how monetary policy affects the corporate bond
premium through the liquidity premium of the corporate bonds, and, through this channel,
16For more details on the history of the implementation of the TRACE, see Bessembinder and Maxwell
(2008) and Asquith, Covert, and Pathak (2013).
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a higher nominal policy rate decreases the corporate bond premium, as in Proposition 1.
However, there is other channel as well through which monetary policy can influence the
corporate bond premium. According to the literature on the credit channel of monetary
policy transmission, when financial market imperfections are present, a higher nominal policy
rate increases the corporate bond premium by tightening credit constraints and subsequently
affecting firms’ ability to borrow.17 This means that the end effect of monetary policy on
the corporate bond premium depends on the relative strength of the (negative) liquidity
premium channel and the (positive) credit channel.
Gertler and Karadi (2015) find that an increase in the nominal policy rate increases the
corporate bond premium using the data with the sample period 1979–2012. This suggests
that, during that overall period, the credit channel is stronger than the liquidity premium
channel. Noting that the liquidity premium channel must be stronger during the post-
TRACE period, I make the following hypotheses. When the effect of an increase in the
nominal policy rate is positive in the overall period, the magnitude of the effect should be
larger during the pre-TRACE period when the negative liquidity premium channel barely
exists. On the other hand, the magnitude of the effect should be smaller during the post-
TRACE period when the negative liquidity premium channel is active. Or, the effect could
potentially be overturned and become negative if the liquidity premium channel is strong
enough.
In the empirical analysis in the following sections, I test the hypotheses and show that
this is the case. In Section 4.2, I compare the effect of monetary policy on the corporate
bond premium across the two periods before and after the introduction of the TRACE. In
doing so, the liquidity premium channel is identified by the difference in the effects across two
periods. In Section 4.3, I measure the liquidity premium channel using more direct liquidity
measures, such as bid-ask spreads and trading volume. In Section 4.4, I examine how bank
loan rates respond to monetary policy changes. These altogether provide empirical support
to Proposition 1.
17See for instance Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999).
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4.2 Corporate Bond Premium and Monetary Policy Shocks
4.2.1 Empirical Framework
For the corporate bond premium, I use the excess bond premium measured by Gilchrist and
Zakraǰsek (2012), which is an extracted component of credit spreads that is not directly
attributable to the expected default risk. I estimate the dynamic response of the excess
bond premium to a monetary policy shock. I use the structural vector autoregression with
external instruments (SVAR-IV) that was introduced by Stock (2008) and Mertens and Ravn
(2013), and apply it to monetary policy, following Gertler and Karadi (2015). The SVAR-
IV includes four variables: the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate (as the policy rate),
industrial production (100 times log of it), the consumer price index (100 times log of it), and
the excess bond premium. To ensure the results are not driven by other macro factors and
to limit any potential reverse causality issues, as exogenous variations in the policy rates, I
use three-month-ahead financial market surprises from Federal Funds futures in a 30-minute
window around the Federal Open Market Committee policy announcements, constructed by
Gertler and Karadi (2015). In addition, I use the local projection instrumental variable (LP-
IV) approach, following Jordà (2005), Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2020). The baseline
specification for horizon h is yt+h− yt−1 = α
h + βhrt + ut+h, where y are the main variables,
r is the policy rate that is instrumented, and βh refers to the impulse response at horizon h.
The same four variables and instruments are used for estimation.
The sample period spans 1990:2–2016:12 with monthly frequency. For both SVAR-IV
and LP-IV specifications, 12-month lags of the four main variables and 4-month lags of the
instrument are used as control variables, following Gertler and Karadi (2015). I do the unit
effect normalization following Stock and Watson (2018) for direct estimation of the dynamic
causal effect in the native units relevant to policy analysis. Standard errors are calculated
using the sample variances computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap
for SVAR-IV following Stock and Watson (2018), and using the Newey-West heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors for LP-IV. For each point estimate along the
horizons, the 95% confidence interval is given.























Figure 2. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normal-
ization. Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12; pre-TRACE period: 1990:2–2003:2; post-TRACE
period: 2003:3–2016:12. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval.
premium before and after the introduction of the TRACE, I divide the sample period into
two: 1990:2–2003:2 for the pre-TRACE period and 2003:3–2016:12 for the post-TRACE
period. Considering the fact that required reporting of corporate bond transactions to the
public was phased in over the period 2002:7–2006:1, I choose the midpoint 2003:3 as a
benchmark when the mandatory reporting was imposed on a significant portion of corporate
bonds. I check that the results are robust to alternative breakpoints.
4.2.2 Results
The response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate estimated using SVAR-IV is given in Figure 2, and the response estimated using LP-IV
is given in Figure 3. In both Figures 2 and 3, the left panel is for the entire period, the middle
panel is for the pre-TRACE period, and the right panel is for the post-TRACE period. To
ensure that the instrument is valid, I check the heteroscedasticity-robust F -statistic from
the first-stage regression, and all are safely above the threshold suggested by Stock, Wright,
and Yogo (2002) to rule out a reasonable likelihood of a weak instruments problem.
Monetary policy shock considered is a one-percent increase in the 1-year Treasury con-
stant maturity rate, which I consider as the policy rate. When estimated using the entire
sample, consistent with the results of Gertler and Karadi (2015), the excess bond premium























Figure 3. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization.
Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12; pre-TRACE period: 1990:2–2003:2; post-TRACE period:
2003:3–2016:12. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval.
of the excess bond premium is different when we look at the two different periods: the pre-
and the post-TRACE periods. For the pre-TRACE period, the positive response of the
excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate appears more
persistent and significant. On the other hand, for the post-TRACE period, the response
of the excess bond premium is not just less strong but it becomes negative. These results
are consistent with the hypotheses. The whole period covers both the pre-TRACE period
where the negative liquidity premium channel is less effective and the post-TRACE period
where the negative liquidity premium channel is more effective. It turns out that during the
post-TRACE period the negative liquidity premium channel is strong enough to dominate
the positive credit channel.
4.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
This section checks the robustness of the decline in the excess bond premium following an
increase in the nominal policy rate during the post-TRACE period.
Factor-augmented LP-IV. As Stock and Watson (2018) point out, if there are more than
four shocks that affect the four variables, or if some elements of the four variables are
measured with error (such as industrial production, the consumer price index, or the inflation
rate), including additional variables that are correlated with the shocks could increase the
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precision of the estimation. As suggested by Stock and Watson (2018), I add lags of principal
components, or factors, computed from the FRED-MD database by McCracken and Ng
(2016) to the LP-IV setting. The response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent
increase in the nominal policy rate estimated using factor-augmented LP-IV is given in
Figure B1. The additional controls yield results that are consistent with (and stronger than)
the results estimated using LP-IV.
Test for a structural break. To test a structural break induced by the introduction of the
TRACE, I interact all the regressors in LP-IV and factor-augmented LP-IV with the post-
TRACE year dummy. Figure B2 shows the base and the post-TRACE responses of the
excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate estimated using
LP-IV, and Figure B3 estimates the responses using factor-augmented LP-IV. As can be seen,
an increase in the nominal policy rate has a negative impact for the post-TRACE period.
Although the negative impact is not significant in the early horizons, the null hypothesis
of no structural break is rejected for all horizons with p-value 0 for both LP-IV and factor-
augmented LP-IV.
Zero lower bound. The sample period, especially the post-TRACE period, includes the
Great Recession, and, during that period, the short-term interest rate reached the zero lower
bound. However, Swanson and Williams (2014) argue that the zero lower bound was not
a constraint on the Federal Reserve’s ability to manipulate the 2-year rate, which might
have been probably less true for the 1-year rate. To address the concern about the zero
lower bound, I show the results are robust to using the 2-year Treasury constant maturity
rate, instead of the 1-year rate, although, as Gertler and Karadi (2015) point out, the 2-
year rate is less relevant with the instrument in the first-stage regression compared to the
1-year rate and thus suffers the weak instruments problem. Figure B4, B5 and B6 show the
response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate for
the entire period, the pre-TRACE period, and the post-TRACE period, respectively using
LP-IV, factor-augmented LP-IV, and SVAR-IV, using the 2-year rate. All the results are
consistent with those using the 1-year rate.
Estimates during the shorter period around the introduction of the TRACE. Another con-
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cern over the fact that the sample period, especially the post-TRACE period, includes the
Great Recession is that it was a very different time in terms of monetary policy, for example,
in that the central bank used unconventional credit market interventions such as a series of
quantitative easing to affect market interest rates. This therefore implies that the pre- and
the post-TRACE periods are different not just because of the introduction of the TRACE
but because of all that was happening during and after the crisis. To address this concern and
to make the pre- and the post-TRACE periods as similar as possible except for the existence
of the TRACE, I narrow the sample period to a shorter window around the introduction
of the TRACE to exclude the 2008:7–2009:6 crisis period. I consider 1997:11–2003:2 as the
pre-TRACE period and 2003:3–2008:6 as the post-TRACE period. Due to the singularity
problem with the long lag length, I decrease the lag length of the four main variables to 4
months and that of the instrument to 2 months. Figure B7 shows the response of the excess
bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate for the entire period,
the pre-TRACE period, and the post-TRACE period using LP-IV during the shorter sample
period. Although the small sample size generates large standard errors and using the short
lag length is subject to a weak instruments problem, the results, especially the one for the
post-TRACE period, suggest the decline in the excess bond premium following a one-percent
increase in the nominal policy rate when the negative liquidity premium channel is active
and strong. Figure B8 and B9 perform the same exercise using SVAR-IV. Even with the
shorter sampler period that does not include the recent crisis, the responses of the excess
bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate during the pre- and the
post-TRACE periods are extremely contrasting and significant, with the former during the
pre-TRACE period being the exact same as in Gertler and Karadi (2015) and the latter
during the post-TRACE period being a total opposite.
Different lag lengths. I check the robustness of the results with different lag lengths. When
the lag length of the main variables is shorter than 9 months, the first-stage regression suffers
a weak instruments problem with both the F -statistic the robust F -statistic being less than
the threshold suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002). For a lag length longer than or
equal to 9 months (I checked up to 24 months), the results remain consistent.
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Alternative breakpoints. The obvious alternative breakpoint is 2002:7 when the mandatory
reporting was first executed. All the results discussed remain the same. Using other break-
points such as 2003:4 (when the mandatory reporting was applied to additional 120 selected
BBB-rated bonds), 2005:2 (when the mandatory reporting was applied to all but newly is-
sued or lightly traded bonds) or 2006:1 (when transaction information for all publicly issued
bonds started to be made public) also does not change the results at all.
4.3 Liquidity Premium and Monetary Policy Shocks
In the previous section, the liquidity premium channel of monetary policy transmission is
identified indirectly by the difference of the effects of monetary policy on the corporate
bond premium across the pre- and the post-TRACE periods. In this section, I measure
the liquidity premium channel using direct liquidity measures such as bid-ask spreads and
trading volume.
4.3.1 Empirical Framework
I add a liquidity measure of corporate bonds to the SVAR-IV and the LP-IV setups described
in the previous section. The two most common liquidity measures are bid-ask spreads and
trading volume. The measures are based on corporate bond transaction data from the
TRACE database. I follow Adrian, Fleming, Shachar, and Vogt (2017) in calculating the
measures. The bid-ask spreads compute average daily bid-ask spreads by month across
bonds. First, spreads are calculated daily for each bond as the difference between the average
(volume-weighted) dealer-to-client buy price (the price at which dealers are willing to buy, or
bid) and the average (volume-weighted) dealer-to-client sell price (the price at which dealers
are willing to sell, or ask). Then, the spreads are averaged across bonds using equal weighting
and across days for each month. The trading volume computes the average daily trading
volume by month across bonds. Both liquidity measures enter the specification as 100 times
log of them. Because to compute the liquidity measures I use the TRACE database that

















Figure 4. Response of the bid-ask spreads of corporate bonds to a one-percent increase in the
nominal policy rate during the post-TRACE period, estimated using LP-IV and SVAR-IV
with unit effect normalization. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. Dashed lines are the 95%
confidence interval.
4.3.2 Results
The more liquid corporate bonds, the narrower the bid-ask spreads, and the larger the
trading volume. In other words, liquidity and the bid-ask spreads are negatively correlated,
while liquidity and the trading volume are positively correlated. For all results, I check
the heteroscedasticity-robust F -statistic from the first-stage regression to ensure that the
results are not subject to a weak instruments problem, and all are safely above the threshold
suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002). The monetary policy shock considered is a
one-percent increase in the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate. Figure 4 estimates the
response of the bid-ask spreads to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate using
SVAR-IV and LP-IV. In both panels, the bid-ask spreads decrease following a one-percent
increase in the nominal policy rate. Figure 5 estimates the response of the trading volume
to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate using SVAR-IV and LP-IV. In both
panels, the trading volume increases following a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate. For both the bid-ask spreads and the trading volume, the responses are not significant
for SVAR-IV, but the responses are highly significant for LP-IV. The results support the
















Figure 5. Response of the trading volume of corporate bonds to a one-percent increase in the
nominal policy rate during the post-TRACE period, estimated using LP-IV and SVAR-IV
with unit effect normalization. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. Dashed lines are the 95%
confidence interval.
the theory that suggests that a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate increases the
liquidity premium of corporate bonds.
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
This section checks the robustness of the positive response of the liquidity premium to a
one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate, following the checklists from Section 4.2.3. I
augment the LP-IV setting with the macroeconomic factors from the FRED-MD database by
McCracken and Ng (2016). The responses of the liquidity measures to a one-percent increase
in the nominal policy rate estimated by factor-augmented LP-IV are given in Figure B10.
While the response of the trading volume is less clear, the response of the bid-ask spreads is
consistent with (and stronger than) the results estimated using LP-IV. To address the concern
over the 1-year rate hitting the zero lower bound during the Great Recession, I estimate the
response of both the liquidity measures to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate
using LP-IV and SVAR-IV with the 2-year Treasury constant maturity rate instead of the
1-year rate. Figure B11 and B12 show the response of the bid-ask spreads and the trading
volume, respectively. Although, as Gertler and Karadi (2015) point out, the 2-year rate is
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less relevant with the instrument in the first-stage regression compared to the 1-year rate and
thus suffers the weak instruments problem, all the results are consistent with those using the
1-year rates. The results also remain the same when using different lag lengths for the lag
length that does not suffer a weak instruments problem (longer than or equal to 10 months
for the bid-ask spreads and 7 months for the trading volume). Using alternative breakpoints
does not change the results either.
4.4 Bank Loan Rates and Monetary Policy Shocks
This section provides the empirical evidence that an increase in the nominal policy rate raises
real bank loan rates, as opposed to the case of corporate bonds.
4.4.1 Empirical Framework
I add the business loan rate to the SVAR-IV and the LP-IV setups described in Section 4.2.
In particular, the real rate is of my interest and I calculate it as the nominal loan rate minus
the expected inflation rate. The nominal loan rate is the bank business prime loan rate, and
the expected inflation rate is the 5-year forward inflation expectation rate from the Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The expected
inflation rate series exists from 2003, so the sample period considered in this section is the
post-TRACE period.
4.4.2 Results
The heteroscedasticity-robust F -statistics from the first-stage regressions ensure that the
results are not subject to a weak instrument problem, and all are safely above the threshold
suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002). The monetary policy shock considered is a
one-percent increase in the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate. Figure 6 estimates the
response of the real loan rate to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate using
SVAR-IV and LP-IV. In both panels, following a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
















Figure 6. Response of the real loan rate to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate during the post-TRACE period, estimated using LP-IV and SVAR-IV with unit effect
normalization. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval.
4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
This section checks the robustness of the positive response of the real bank loan rate to a
one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate, following the checklists from Section 4.2.3.
I augment the LP-IV setting with the macroeconomic factors from the FRED-MD database
by McCracken and Ng (2016). The response of the real bank loan rate to a one-percent
increase in the nominal policy rate estimated by factor-augmented LP-IV is given in Figure
B13. The results are consistent with those using LP-IV. To address the concern over the
1-year rate hitting the zero lower bound during the Great Recession, I estimate the response
of the real bank loan rate to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate using LP-IV
and SVAR-IV with the 2-year Treasury constant maturity rate instead of the 1-year rate.
Although, as Gertler and Karadi (2015) point out, the 2-year rate is less relevant with the
instrument in the first-stage regression compared to the 1-year rate and thus suffers the
weak instruments problem, the results are in Figure B14 and all are consistent with those
using the 1-year rates. The results also remain the same when using different lag lengths for
the lag length that does not suffer a weak instruments problem (longer than or equal to 6
months). Using alternative breakpoints does not change the results either.
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5 Compositional Effect of Monetary Policy on Credit
In this section, I examine how monetary policy changes induce a shift in the composition of
credit between corporate bonds and loans at the firm level. While previously the measure
λ ∈ (0, 1) of firms were assumed to finance solely through issuing corporate bonds, now
those firms that have access to the corporate bond market can also try to obtain a loan from
a bank. In addition, a firm meets, or can find, a bank that is willing to give a loan with
probability α ∈ (0, 1), as in Rocheteau, Wright, and Zhang (2018). α can be thought of as a
loan application acceptance rate. This means that, among the measure λ of the firms that
have access to the corporate bond market, αλ will be able to finance through both issuing
corporate bonds and obtaining a bank loan. In such case, I assume firms will first decide
how many corporate bonds to issue and then go to the OTC market for bank loans.18 The
other (1 − α)λ will not be able to find a bank that is willing to give a loan and thus will
have to finance investment only through issuing corporate bonds. (1 − α)(1 − λ) among
the measure 1 − λ of the firms that do not have access to the corporate bond market will
not be able to borrow from a bank and thus cannot produce any in the first subperiod. To
simplify the presentation, I normalize the measure of consumers to α + (1− α)λ so that all
the consumers match with a firm in bilateral meetings in the DM.
5.1 Value Functions
The value functions of suppliers remain the same as before. A bank in the second subperiod
randomly matches with a firm, and there are two types of firms: one that has access to the
corporate bond market and the other that does not. Denote the terms of a loan contract
between a bank and a firm that cannot issue corporate bonds by (kL, rLℓ ) and the terms of
a loan contract between a bank and a firm that can issue corporate bonds by (kB, rBℓ ). The
value function of a bank that is willing to give a loan to a firm that cannot issue corporate
18The timing of events is important in getting the desired result that firms use both ways of financing
when they have access to both the corporate bond and the bank loan markets. If it is assumed that firms
first go to the OTC market for bank loans and then turn to the corporate bond market, then they will not





c+ βWB((1 + rLℓ )k
L) s.t. c+ kL = w, (43)




c+ βWB((1 + rBℓ )k
B) s.t. c+ kB = w. (44)
The value function of a firm that does not have access to the corporate bond market
and thus has to borrow from a bank to finance investment remains the same as before, as in
(7) and (8), but now the terms of a loan contract are denoted by (kL, rLℓ ). The value function
of a firm that has access to the corporate bond but could not borrow from a bank is the
same as that of a firm that finances investment solely by issuing corporate bonds, as in (9)
and (10).
Consider a firm that has access to the corporate bond market and also finds a bank
that is willing to give a loan. The terms of a loan contract are denoted by (kB, rBℓ ). The
value function in the first subperiod of the firm that issued Â amount of corporate bonds at
price ψ and that obtained kB amount of a loan from a bank at a real lending rate rBℓ in the
previous second subperiod is
V F (ψÂ+ kB, Â+ (1 + rBℓ )k
B) = W F (ψÂ+ kB − q, p, Â+ (1 + rBℓ )k
B), (45)
where (p, q) are the terms of trade in the following DM. The value function of a firm in the
second subperiod after trading in the DM is




s.t. c = ψÂ+ kB − q + p− Â− (1 + rBℓ )k
B,
which simply reduces toW F (ψÂ+kB−q, p, Â+(1+rBℓ )k
B) = ψÂ+kB−q+p−Â−(1+rBℓ )k
B.
Using the linearity of W F, a newborn firm in the second subperiod with a loan contract
36
(kB, rBℓ ) decides the amount of corporate bonds to issue by solving
max
Â≥0
βV F (ψÂ+ kB, Â+ (1 + rBℓ )k
B) = max
Â≥0
β{(p− q)− (1− ψ)Â− rBℓ k
B}. (47)
A consumer in the DM matches with a firm that does not have access to the corporate
bond market but was able to borrow from a bank with probability α(1− λ)/(α+ (1− α)λ),
a firm that has access to the corporate bond market and also was able to borrow from a
bank with probability αλ/(α+ (1− α)λ), and a firm that has access to the corporate bond
market but was not able to borrow from a bank with probability (1 − α)λ/(α + (1 − α)λ).
The value function of a consumer who brings m̂ amount of real balances and â amount of
corporate bonds to the DM is
V C(m̂, â) =
α(1− λ)
α + (1− α)λ
[u(qL)− pL] +
αλ
α + (1− α)λ
[u(q)− p] +
(1− α)λ




Now there are two types of meetings in the OTC market for loans in the second subperiod:
one between a bank and a firm that does not have access to the corporate bond market,
and the other between a bank and a firm that has access to the corporate bond market and
thus has issued corporate bonds before entering the OTC market for loans. The bargaining
problem in the former meeting is the same as in the previous environment, and the solution
is given by (16) and (17).
In the latter meeting, a bank and a firm bargain over the terms of a loan contract,
(kB, rBℓ ). Consider a meeting between a bank and a firm that has already raised ψA amount
of funds by issuing A amount of corporate bonds at price ψ. I restrict attention as in
Section 3.4 under Assumption 1 to the case where the price of the corporate bonds is not
too high so that financing through corporate bonds is expensive and that firms financing
through corporate bonds are not able to satisfy the consumer’s demand in the DM. The
firm’s continuation value with a loan contract (kB, rBℓ ) is βV
F (ψA + kB, A + (1 + rBℓ )k
B),
and the firm’s continuation value without a loan contract is βV F (ψA,A). Thus, the firm’s
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surplus is β[V F (ψA+kB, A+(1+rBℓ )k
B)−V F (ψA,A)]. Given that firms will not raise funds
more than what they need to satisfy the consumer’s demand, using (12), (13) and (45), this
reduces to [(1−θ)(u(ψA+kB)−(ψA+kB))−(1−ψ)A−rBℓ k
B]−[(1−θ)(u(ψA)−ψA)−(1−ψ)A]
subject to kB ≤ v−1(m̃+χã)−ψA, when the firm and the bank believe that a consumer will
carry m̃ amount of real balances and ã amount of corporate bonds to the DM. The bank’s
surplus is βrℓk as before. The terms of a loan contract specify (k













(1− θ)(u(ψA)− ψA)− (1− ψ)A
)]1−η
.
The solution is such that k maximizes the total surplus, (1− θ)[u(ψA+ kB)− u(ψA)− kB],
subject to kB ≤ v−1(m̃+ χã)− ψA. The solution is given by
kB = v−1(m̃+ χã)− ψA, (50)








From (12), (13), (47), (50) and (51), at a given price ψ, the firm chooses the amount of
corporate bonds to issue, A ≥ 0, to maximize
max
A
(1− θ)[u(v−1(m+ χa))− v−1(m+ χa)]− (1− ψ)A− rBℓ k
B, (52)
which is equivalent to maximizing
max
A
η(1− θ)[u(ψA)− ψA]− (1− ψ)A. (53)
The solution describes the optimal corporate bond issuance decision of the firm, or the supply
of corporate bonds, which is given by
1
ψ
− 1 = η(1− θ)(u′(ψĀ)− 1), (54)
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5.4 Composition of Credit
Now I examine the optimal composition of credit between corporate bonds and bank loans at
the firm level. The result in (55) shows that a firm wants to issue some amount of corporate
bonds before entering the OTC market for bank loans. The intuition is as follows. From
(51), rBℓ is an increasing function of ψA. This is because firms with large corporate bond
issuance rely less on bank loans (as can be seen from (50) that kB is decreasing in ψA) and
can negotiate for a lower real loan rate (as can be seen from (51) that rBℓ is decreasing in
kB). The benefit of issuing corporate bonds in negotiating for a bank loan is the first term
in (53), η(1 − θ)[u(ψA) − ψA], which comes from −rBℓ k
B in (52). The cost side of issuing
corporate bonds is the second term in (53), −(1−ψ)A, the liabilities that the firm needs to
pay to the consumers who are holding the corporate bonds. The concave benefit function
and the linear cost function together determine the optimal composition of credit as in (50)
and (55).
Monetary policy changes affect this composition of credit between corporate bonds
and bank loans. A higher nominal policy rate, i, decreases the total size of credit as the
consumer’s demand declines due to the higher cost of holding liquidity, as can be seen from
(50) that ψA+ kB equals v−1(m+ χa) which in turn is a decreasing function of i from (26).
On the other hand, at the same time, as is explained in Section 3.5 and Proposition 1 says,
a higher nominal policy rate makes issuing corporate bonds less expensive, allowing firms to
issue more corporate bonds for the strategic purpose of lowering their financing costs, as can
be seen from (55) that the left-hand side, ψA, is an increasing function of ψ which in turn
is an increasing function of i. As a result, with a higher nominal policy rate, firms borrow
less from banks. Therefore, as the nominal policy rate increases, the portion of corporate
bonds among the total credit becomes larger, and that of bank loans becomes smaller. The
following proposition summarizes the discussion.
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Proposition 2. As the nominal policy rate increases, the size of total credit decreases.
Among the total credit that becomes smaller, firms increase the portion of credit from issuing
























Becker and Ivashina (2014) provide direct empirical support for this theoretical finding by
showing that firms switch from bank loans to corporate bonds following an increase in the
nominal policy rate.
6 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, I study optimal monetary policy for the period, such as the post-TRACE
period, when the liquidity premium channel of monetary policy transmission is dominant in
the response of the bond premium to the nominal policy rate. To simplify the presentation,
I consider the environment described in Section 2.19 With the settlement market at the end
of each period, maximizing welfare is equivalent to maximizing the per-period welfare that
equals the sum of the per-period utility of each agent. The per-period utility of suppliers
is 0 due to the CRS technology. The per-period utility of firms that finance investment by
borrowing from a bank is pL − qL − rℓk and their total measure is 1 − λ. The per-period
utility of firms that finance investment by issuing corporate bonds is pB− qB− (1−ψ)A and
their total measure is λ. The per-period utility of banks that lend to a firm is rℓk and their
total measure is 1 − λ. The per-period utility of consumers is −(1 + π)m − ψa +m + a +
T + (1− λ)[u(qL)− pL] + λ[u(qB)− pB], where T = πm. The per-period utility of all agents
19Discussing optimal monetary policy in the extended environment described in Section 5 requires just
a simple relabeling. Notice from (16) and (50) that when a firm has the option of financing both through
issuing corporate bonds and borrowing from a bank, such firm will borrow in total from both the corporate
bond and the bank loan markets the same amount as the firm that finances only through bank loans. Relabel
the fraction of the firms that are borrowing from a bank with or without issuing corporate bonds as 1− λ̄,
instead of 1− λ. Then, the welfare analysis becomes the exact same as discussed in this section.
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sums up to
W ≡ (1− λ)[u(qL)− qL] + λ[u(qB)− qB]. (57)
A common result in monetary theory is that an increase in the nominal policy rate hurts
welfare: a higher nominal policy rate increases the opportunity cost of holding liquidity,
induces agents to carry less liquidity, and reduces the quantity of goods they can afford.
In this economy, however, the Friedman rule—implementing zero nominal policy rate—is
suboptimal. The intuition is as follows. When meeting a firm for trade, agents can meet
a firm that financed only by issuing corporate bonds, or a firm that obtained a loan from
a bank. Increasing the nominal policy rate has the opposite effects across the two types
of meetings. On the one hand, increasing the nominal policy rate makes issuing corporate
bonds less expensive and thus helps firms raise more funds and bring a larger amount of
intermediate goods to trades in the former type of meeting. More precisely, a higher nominal
policy rate increases the price of corporate bonds by increasing their liquidity premium from
(30); the higher price of corporate bonds makes issuing corporate bonds cheaper, allowing
firms to raise more funds from (21); and firms can produce more goods in trades by bringing
a larger amount of intermediate goods from (29) or (31). On the other hand, increasing
the nominal policy rate increases the cost of holding money and makes consumers carry less
liquidity, which in turn makes firms borrow less from banks due to the lower demand and
hurts the latter type of meeting. More precisely, a higher nominal policy rate reduces the
real amount of liquidity that consumers carry with themselves for trades from (26); due to
the lower demand, firms will borrow less from banks from (16); and a smaller amount of
goods are produced from (34). Consider that the nominal policy rate is currently low so
that the borrowing cost in the corporate bond market is high and a relatively small amount
of goods are produced in the former type of meeting, while the borrowing cost in the bank
loan market is low and already a large amount of goods are produced in the latter type of
meeting. In such case, the welfare loss from the latter type of meeting is only second order,
while the welfare gain from the former type of meeting becomes first order. More precisely,
















Figure 7. Effect of monetary policy on the aggregate outcomes
the welfare loss from the latter type of meeting, and the second term represents the welfare
gain from the former type of meeting because ∂(u(qL) − qL)/∂i < 0 since ∂qL/∂i < 0 and
because ∂(u(qB)−qB)/∂i > 0 since ∂qB/∂i > 0. However, at the Friedman rule, when i→ 0,
∂(u(qL) − qL)/∂i → 0 because qL → q
∗ as i → 0 and u′(q∗) = 1. Therefore, when i → 0,
∂W/∂i = λ · ∂(u(qB) − qB)/∂i > 0. That is, at the Friedman rule, increasing the nominal
policy rate can be welfare improving. The following proposition summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 3. A deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal, i.e., the optimal monetary
policy requires i > 0.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the nominal policy rate and the welfare of the
economy, along with other aggregate variables. The main force that drives a positive nominal














Figure 8. The corporate bond secondary market liquidity and the distribution of firms along
their ways of financing matters for the optimal policy rate.
the stronger the channel, the higher the optimal policy rate. Figure 8 provides numerical
examples that support this argument. In particular, the optimal nominal policy rate depends
on the corporate bond secondary market liquidity and the distribution of firms along their
ways of financing. The more liquid the corporate bond secondary market, or the more firms
financing through issuing corporate bonds, the higher the optimal policy rate.
7 Conclusion
Central banks influence firms’ investment through controlling the nominal policy rate, which
then gets transmitted to the real rates at which firms borrow. I study this transmission
mechanism in a general equilibrium macroeconomic model where firms have two options
for external financing: they can issue corporate bonds or obtain bank loans. A theoretical
novelty of my model is that corporate bonds are not just stores of value but also serve
a liquidity role. The model delivers three predictions. First, an increase in the nominal
policy rate can lower the borrowing cost in the corporate bond market, while increasing that
in the bank loan market. This is in sharp contrast with the common belief that all rates
in the economy move in the same direction in response to changes in monetary policy. I
highlight the role of asset liquidity in this result and provide empirical evidence. Second,
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a higher nominal policy rate induces firms to substitute corporate bonds for bank loans,
and this result is supported by the existing empirical evidence. Third, the Friedman rule is
suboptimal so that keeping the cost of holding liquidity at a positive level is socially optimal.
The optimal policy rate is an increasing function of the degree of corporate bond liquidity.
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A.1 Full Characterization of the Equilibrium
This section characterizes the equilibrium beyond the parameter space in Assumption 1.
First start with the optimal behavior of a firm that finances investment by issuing corporate
bonds. From (10), at a given price ψ, the firm chooses the amount of corporate bonds to
issue, A ≥ 0, that maximizes (pB − qB) − (1 − ψ)A, which, using (12) and (13), reduces to
(1 − θ)(u(qB) − qB) − (1 − ψ)A, where qB = min{v
−1(m̃ + χã), ψA} when believing that
a consumer will carry m̃ amount of real balances and ã amount of corporate bonds to the
DM. An equilibrium exists when 1− ψ > 0, or ψ < 1, that is, when borrowing through the
corporate bond market is costly. Assumption 2, given below, guarantees that this is the case.
Since the firm will not want to bring more capital to the DM than it needs to produce the




{(1− θ)(u(ψA)− ψA)− (1− ψ)A}. (58)
The solution describes the optimal corporate bond issuance decision of the firm, or the supply
of corporate bonds, and is given by




− 1 = (1− θ)(u′(ψĀ)− 1). (60)
Now consider the optimal behavior of a consumer who chooses a portfolio of real balances
and corporate bonds. From (2), the consumer chooses the amount of real balances, m, and
the amount of corporate bonds, a, that maximize −(1+π)m−ψa+βV C(m, a), which, using
1




− (1 + π)m− ψa+ βm+ βa+ β(1− λ)[u(qL)− pL] + βλ[u(qB)− pB]
}
. (61)
When believing that a firm that issues corporate bonds will issue Ã amount of corporate
bonds and bring ψÃ amount of capital to the DM and that a firm that borrows from a
bank will bring k̃ amount of capital to the DM, qL = min{v
−1(m + χa), k̃} and qB =
min{v−1(m + χa), ψÃ}. Depending on the relative size of k̃, ψÃ and v−1(m + χa), the
maximization problem is:




− (1 + π)m− ψa+ βm+ βa+ β
[








− (1 + π)m− ψa+ βm+ βa+ β(1− λ)
[









− (1 + π)m− ψa+ βm+ βa+ βλ
[








− (1 + π)m− ψa+ βm+ βa
}
. (65)
I consider an equilibrium where expectations are rational. (64) is not a relevant case with
ψÃ < k̃ from (16) and (59), and (65) does not have a solution. The solution describes
the optimal portfolio choice of real balances and corporate bonds of the consumer, or the
demand for real balances and corporate bonds. The solution to (63) satisfies
m+ χa = max{v(ψÃ), m̄+ χā} (66)
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where m̄+ χā solves
1 + π = β
{








i = (1− λ)L(m̄+ χā), (68)
where i ≡ (1 + π)/β − 1 and L(·) ≡ u′(v−1(·))/v′(v−1(·))− 1 with L′(·) < 0. The solution to
(62) satisfies
m+ χa = min{v(ψÃ), m̄+ χā} (69)
where m̄+ χā solves










i = L(m̄+ χā). (71)
For both cases, the price of corporate bonds is given by
ψ = β(1 + χi). (72)
Note that m̄+χā is the amount of liquidity consumers would decide to bring to the DM
when their liquidity position will be on the shorter side of the bargaining only if they trade
with a firm that borrows from a bank, and that m̄+χā is the amount of liquidity consumers
would decide to bring to the DM when their liquidity position will always be on the shorter
side of the bargaining whether a firm they meet finances investment by borrowing from a bank
or by issuing corporate bonds. By comparing (68) and (71), we see that m̄+ χā < m̄+ χā.
There are three cases depending on the relative size of v(ψĀ), m̄+ χā and m̄+ χā given i.
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Define ι and ι as follows:
ι ≡
(1− λ)(1− β)θ




1− θ + βθχ
. (74)
The first is when i ≤ ι and v(ψĀ) ≤ m̄ + χā < m̄ + χā. This is when the price of the
corporate bonds is not high enough for firms to finance investment enough to fully satisfy
the consumer’s demand, m̄+χā. Hence, the firms that are borrowing from a bank and thus
can satisfy the consumer’s demand are at the margin of the consumer’s decision on how much
liquidity to bring to the DM. The second is when ι < i ≤ ι and m̄+ χā < v(ψĀ) ≤ m̄+ χā.
This is when the price of the corporate bonds is high enough for firms to finance investment
enough to satisfy m̄ + χā, but not high enough to satisfy m̄ + χā. When this is the case, a
consumer will bring liquidity just enough to be able to purchase ψĀ amount of the DM goods,
and such amount of liquidity will make the consumer on the shorter side of the bargaining
with both the firms that are borrowing from a bank and the firms that are issuing corporate
bonds. The third case is when ι < i and m̄ + χā < m̄ + χā ≤ v(ψĀ), that is, when the
price of the corporate bonds is high enough to satisfy m̄+ χā. In this case, a consumer will
decide the amount of liquidity to bring to the DM with considering both the firms that are
borrowing from a bank and the firms that are issuing corporate bonds at the same margin.
The firms with access to the corporate bond market will issue corporate bonds just enough
to satisfy m̄+ χā.20
Now I specify the assumption that ensures ψ < 1 so that borrowing through the corpo-
rate bond market is costly.




The equilibrium is defined as below.
Definition 2. A steady state equilibrium of the economy corresponds to a constant sequence
(qL, qB,m, a,A,ψ, k, rℓ), where qL is the DM goods traded between a consumer and a firm that
20For each given i, there are more equilibria other than those described above. The most trivial one is
when no one brings any thinking that everyone else will bring nothing. Although this belief can be consistent
in equilibrium, however, such equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. In this paper, I consider the Pareto efficient
equilibrium for each i.
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finances investment by borrowing from a bank, qB is the DM goods traded between a consumer
and a firm that finances investment by issuing corporate bonds, m is the consumer’s real
balance holdings, a is the consumer’s corporate bond holdings, A is the supply of corporate
bonds issued by firms, ψ is the price of corporate bonds, k is the size of a loan that a bank
lends to a firm, and rℓ is the real lending rate of loans. Under Assumption 2, (qL, qB) satisfy:













1− β(1 + χi)




for ι < i ≤ ι,
qL = qB = (u
′)−1
(
1− β(1 + χi)




and for ι < i,
qL = qB = v
−1(L−1(i)). (78)
(m, a,A,ψ) satisfy
ψ = β(1 + χi), (79)
A = qB/ψ, (80)
a = λA, (81)
m = v(qL)− χa, (82)
and (k, rℓ) satisfy








v(·) = (1− θ)u(·) + θ · , v′(·) > 0, (85)
L(·) = u′(v−1(·))/v′(v−1(·))− 1, L′(·) < 0. (86)
A.1.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
Among i ≤ ι, the welfare-maximizing nominal policy rate depends on the relative size of
(1− λ) · ∂(u(qL)− qL)/∂i < 0 and λ · ∂(u(qB)− qB)/∂i > 0. When neither λ nor χ is large,
the latter force is not so large that the welfare-maximizing policy rate satisfying ∂W/∂i = 0
exists in the interior. When either λ or χ is large, the latter force becomes so large that
the welfare-maximizing policy rate exists on the right boundary at i = ι. In addition, note
that when ι < i ≤ ι, ∂W/∂i > 0 as can be seen from (77), that when ι ≤ i, ∂W/∂i < 0
as can be seen from (78), and therefore that among i > ι, i = ι maximizes the welfare.
These together imply that when neither λ nor χ is large, there will be a welfare-maximizing
policy rate that is less than ι, and that when either λ or χ is large, the welfare-maximizing
policy rate will be ι. Figures A1 and A2 illustrate these observations. Figures A3 (for small
λ and small χ), A4 (for large λ and small χ) and A5 (for small λ and large χ) show the
effect of the nominal policy rate on different variables, including the welfare, the amount of
external financing through bonds and loan, the real balance, the excess bond premium, the
real lending rate, and the average output. In all figures, there are two kinks, and the first
and the second correspond to i = ι and i = ι, respectively. Exceptions are the figures for the
amount of external financing through issuing corporate bonds that display one kink, which
corresponds to i = ι as can be seen from (76), (77) and (78). In all figures, we can see that
the Friedman rule when i→ 0 is not optimal. Also, notice that the relationship between the
welfare and the average output is not monotone, due to the heterogeneity in the effect of the
nominal policy rate across the firms using different financing sources. Figure A6 illustrates
this point.
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A.2 Loan Contract with a Different Timing of Events
There are two types of meetings in the OTC market for loans in the second subperiod: one
between a bank and a firm that does not have access to the corporate bond market, and the
other between a bank and a firm that has access to the corporate bond market and could
issue corporate bonds to finance investment in addition to obtaining a loan from a bank.
The bargaining problem in the former meeting is the same as in the previous environment,
and the solution is given by (16) and (17).
In the latter meeting, a bank and a firm bargain over the terms of a loan contract,
(kB, rBℓ ). As before, I restrict attention to the case in which the firm’s capacity is on the
shorter side of the bargaining in the DM if the firm finances investment solely by issuing








If a firm borrows more than ψĀ from a bank, the firm will have no incentive to issue corporate
bonds to raise more numeraire. On the other hand, if a firm borrows less than ψĀ from a
bank, the firm will issue A amount of corporate bonds so that it raises in total ψĀ = ψA+kB
amount of numeraire.
First consider the latter case in which a firm borrows less than ψĀ from a bank and
will issue A amount of corporate bonds so that it raises in total ψĀ = ψA + kB amount of
numeraire. The firm’s continuation value with a loan contract is βV F (ψA + kB, A + (1 +
rBℓ )k
B), where A = (ψĀ − kB)/ψ so that ψA + kB = ψĀ. The firm’s outside option is
to issue corporate bonds. When the firm could not borrow from a bank, it will issue Ā
amount of corporate bonds, and the firm’s continuation value without a loan contract will
be βV F (ψĀ, Ā). Thus, the firm’s surplus is β[V F (ψĀ,A+(1+ rBℓ )k
B)−V F (ψĀ, Ā)], which,
using (47), reduces to β[(1 − ψ)(Ā − A) − rBℓ k
B]. As before, the bank’s surplus is βrBℓ k
B.

























The solution kB maximizes the total surplus, ((1 − ψ)/ψ)kB, subject to kB ≤ ψĀ. Under
Assumption 1, ψ < 1 and kB = ψĀ, which means the former case is the relevant one.
Now consider the former case in which a firm borrows more than ψĀ from a bank and
has no further incentive to issue corporate bonds. The firm’s continuation value with a loan
contract is βV F (kB, (1 + rBℓ )k
B). The firm’s continuation value of issuing corporate bonds
without a loan contract is βV F (ψĀ, Ā). Thus, the firm’s surplus is β[V F (kB, (1 + rBℓ )k
B)−
V F (ψĀ, Ā)], which, using (12), (13) and (47), reduces to β[(1 − θ)(u(kB) − kB) − rBℓ k
B −
(1 − θ)(u(ψĀ) − ψĀ) + (1 − ψ)Ā]. As before, the bank’s surplus is βrBℓ k
B. The terms of a





(1− θ)(u(kB)− kB)− rBℓ k






where v−1(m̃+χã) is the amount of the DM goods that a consumer can afford when believing
that a consumer will carry m̃ amount of real balances and ã amount of corporate bonds to
the DM, and a firm will not want to borrow more than it needs to produce v−1(m̃ + χã)
amount of the DM goods. The solution is such that kB maximizes the total surplus, (1 −
θ)(u(kB) − kB) − (1 − θ)(u(ψĀ) − ψĀ) + (1 − ψ)Ā, subject to ψĀ ≤ kB ≤ v−1(m̃ + χã)
and thus the solution is as in (16). Therefore, both the firm that has an outside option in
bargaining and the firm that does not will borrow the same amount of loan from a bank.
The real lending rate, however, will be different between the firm that has an outside
option in bargaining and the firm that does not. The real lending rate for the firm that does
not have access to the corporate bond market is given by (17). On the other hand, the real
lending rate for the firm that has access to the corporate bond market is
rBℓ =
η[(1− θ)(u(kB)− kB)− (1− θ)(u(ψĀ)− ψĀ) + (1− ψ)Ā]
kB
, (90)








Figure A1. Effect of monetary policy on the welfare of the economy for different values of
λ. Parameter values: Log utility; β = 0.97; λ = 0.1 (left), 0.165 (middle), 0.35 (right);







Figure A2. Effect of monetary policy on the welfare of the economy for different values of χ.
Parameter values: Log utility; β = 0.97; λ = 0.1; χ = 0.15 (left), 0.25 (middle), 0.35 (right);


















Figure A3. Effect of monetary policy, when the fraction of the firms with access to the
corporate bond market is small (small λ) and the corporate bond secondary market is not



















Figure A4. Effect of monetary policy, when the fraction of the firms with access to the
corporate bond market is large (large λ) and the corporate bond secondary market is not



















Figure A5. Effect of monetary policy, when the fraction of the firms with access to the
corporate bond market is small (small λ) and the corporate bond secondary market is highly
liquid (large χ). Parameter values: Log utility; β = 0.97; λ = 0.1; χ = 0.35; η = 0.8;
θ = 0.95.
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Figure A6. Effect of monetary policy on the welfare and the output of the economy for
small λ (the fraction of the firms with access to the corporate bond market) and small χ
(the liquidity of the corporate bond secondary market) (left), large λ and small χ (middle),
and small λ and large χ (right). For each figure for the welfare, the top line (in bright blue)
plots u(qL)− qL, the bottom line (in bright green) plots u(qB)− qB, and the middle line (in
blue) plots (1− λ)[u(qL)− qL] + λ[u(qB)− qB]. For each figure for the output, the top line
(in bright blue) plots qL, the bottom line (in bright green) plots qB, and the middle line (in
blue) plots (1− λ)qL + λqB. For the parameter values used, refer to the notes in Figure A3
for small λ and small χ, Figure A4 for large λ and small χ, and Figure A5 for small λ and
large χ.
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B Appendix for Empirical Analysis
B.1 Data
For the macro time-series data, I use data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The 1-year and the 2-year policy rates are the
1-Year and the 2-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rates (FRED series GS1 and GS2). Indus-
trial production is Industrial Production Index (FRED series INDPRO). Consumer Price Index
is Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average (FRED
series CPIAUCSL). The expected inflation rate is the 5-Year Forward Inflation Expectation
Rate (FRED series T5YIFRM). The excess bond premium is constructed by Gilchrist and
Zakraǰsek (2012) and keeps updated by Favara, Gilchrist, Lewis, and Zakraǰsek at https:
//www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2016/files/ebp csv.csv. Monetary
policy shocks are the high-frequency identified surprises from Federal Funds futures around
the Federal Open Market Committee policy announcements constructed by Gertler and
Karadi (2015), and the series updated until 2016:12 is from Jarocinśki and Karadi (2020).
B.2 Additional Figures
Figure A7 replicates Gertler and Karadi (2015) with unit effect normalization. Figures B1–
B14 are for sensitivity analysis. Figures C1–C18 show the responses of all variables, not
only the variables of main focus (the excess bond premium (EBP), the bid-ask spreads, the
trading volume, and the real bank loan rate), to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate for all different specifications. For quick references, refer to the following table:
Sample Period Entire Period Pre-TRACE Period Post-TRACE Period
Bid-Ask Trading Loan
Variable of focus EBP EBP EBP Spreads Volume Rate
LP-IV C1 C2 C3 C10 C13 C16
FALP-IV C4 C5 C6 C11 C14 C17
SVAR-IV C7 C8 C9 C12 C15 C18
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Figure A7. Replication of Gertler and Karadi (2015). Response of the 1-year government
bond rate, industrial production, the consumer price index, and the excess bond premium
to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate, estimated using SVAR-IV with unit
effect normalization, during the entire period. Sample period: 1979:7-2012:6. 12-month lags
of the four main variables and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors
are calculated using the sample variances computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric
Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic























Figure B1. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit
effect normalization. Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12; pre-TRACE period: 1990:2–2003:2;
post-TRACE period: 2003:3–2016:12. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. For
details, refer to the notes in Figure C4 for the entire period, Figure C5 for the pre-TRACE
















Figure B2. Base and post-TRACE responses of the excess bond premium to a one-percent
increase in the nominal policy rate, estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization.
Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12; post-TRACE period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of
the four main variables and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors
are calculated using the sample variances computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric
Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic
















Figure B3. Base and post-TRACE responses of the excess bond premium to a one-percent
increase in the nominal policy rate, estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit
effect normalization. Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12; post-TRACE period: 2003:3–2016:12.
12-month lags of the four main variables and the FRED-MD factors and 4-month lags of
the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the sample variances
computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the
95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 13.7, and the heteroscedasticity-robust























Figure B4. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normal-
ization. Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12; pre-TRACE period: 1990:2–2003:2; post-TRACE
period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main variables (2-year Treasury con-
stant maturity rate, industrial production, inflation rate, and the excess bond premium)
and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the
Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Dashed lines
are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic and the heteroscedasticity-robust
first-stage F -statistic are 14.2 and 8.3 for the entire period, 7.7 and 9 for the pre-TRACE























Figure B5. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit
effect normalization. Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12; pre-TRACE period: 1990:2–2003:2;
post-TRACE period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main variables (2-year
Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production, inflation rate, and the excess bond
premium) and the FRED-MD factors and 4-month lags of the instrument are included.
Standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage
F -statistic and the heteroscedasticity-robust first-stage F -statistic are 12.5 and 13 for the
























Figure B6. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normal-
ization. Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12; pre-TRACE period: 1990:2–2003:2; post-TRACE
period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main variables (2-year Treasury constant
maturity rate, industrial production, inflation rate, and the excess bond premium) and 4-
month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the sample
variances computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines
are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic and the heteroscedasticity-robust
first-stage F -statistic are 14.2 and 8.3 for the entire period, 7.7 and 9 for the pre-TRACE























Figure B7. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization,
during the short period around the introduction of the TRACE. Sample period: 1997:11–
2008:6; pre-TRACE period: 1997:11–2003:2; post-TRACE period: 2003:3–2008:6. 4-month
lags of the four main variables and 2-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard
errors are calculated using the sample variances computed from 1,000 draws from a para-
metric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage
F -statistic and the heteroscedasticity-robust first-stage F -statistic are 2.5 and 1.7 for the
























Figure B8. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normal-
ization, during the short period around the introduction of the TRACE. Sample period:
1997:11–2008:6; pre-TRACE period: 1997:11–2003:2; post-TRACE period: 2003:3–2008:6.
4-month lags of the four main variables and 2-month lags of the instrument are included.
Standard errors are calculated using the sample variances computed from 1,000 draws from a
parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage
F -statistic and the heteroscedasticity-robust first-stage F -statistic are 2.5 and 1.7 for the en-
























Figure B9. Response of the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal
policy rate for different sample periods, estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normal-
ization, during the short period around the introduction of the TRACE. Sample period:
1997:11–2008:6; pre-TRACE period: 1997:11–2003:2; post-TRACE period: 2003:3–2008:6.
4-month lags of the four main variables and 2-month lags of the instrument are included.
Standard errors are calculated using the sample variances computed from 1,000 draws from a
parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage
F -statistic and the heteroscedasticity-robust first-stage F -statistic are 2.5 and 1.7 for the en-

















Figure B10. Response of the bid-ask spreads and the trading volume of corporate bonds to
a one-percent increase in the nominal policy rate during the post-TRACE period, estimated
using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit effect normalization. Sample period: 2003:3–
2016:12. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. For details, refer to the notes in
















Figure B11. Response of the bid-ask spreads of corporate bonds to a one-percent increase in
the nominal policy rate during the post-TRACE period, estimated using LP-IV (left) and
SVAR-IV (right) with unit effect normalization. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month
lags of the six main variables (2-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the bid-ask spreads, and inflation expectation)
and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the
Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors for LP-IV and
the sample variances computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap for
SVAR-IV. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 9, and
















Figure B12. Response of the trading volume of corporate bonds to a one-percent increase in
the nominal policy rate during the post-TRACE period, estimated using LP-IV (left) and
SVAR-IV (right) with unit effect normalization. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month
lags of the six main variables (2-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the trading volume, and inflation expectation)
and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the
Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors for LP-IV and
the sample variances computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap for
SVAR-IV. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 11.5,








Figure B13. Response of the real loan rate to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate during the post-TRACE period, estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit
effect normalization. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence
















Figure B14. Response of the real loan rate to a one-percent increase in the nominal pol-
icy rate during the post-TRACE period, estimated using LP-IV (left) and SVAR-IV (right)
with unit effect normalization. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the five
main variables (2-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production, inflation rate,
the excess bond premium, and the real loan rate) and 4-month lags of the instrument are
included. Standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocor-
relation consistent standard errors for LP-IV and the sample variances computed from 1,000
draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap for SVAR-IV. Dashed lines are the 95% confi-
dence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 8.6, and the heteroscedasticity-robust first-stage






























Figure C1. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the entire period. Sample
period: 1990:2–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main variables and 4-month lags of the in-
strument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval.































Figure C2. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the pre-TRACE pe-
riod. Sample period: 1990:2–2003:2. 12-month lags of the four main variables and 4-month
lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95%
confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 15.6, and the heteroscedasticity-robust






























Figure C3. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-TRACE period.
Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main variables and 4-month
lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95%
confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 13.1, and the heteroscedasticity-robust






























Figure C4. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the
entire period. Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main variables and
the FRED-MD factors and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are
calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 19.1, and






























Figure C5. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the
pre-TRACE period. Sample period: 1990:2–2003:2. 12-month lags of the four main variables
and the FRED-MD factors and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors
are calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 6, and the






























Figure C6. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the
post-TRACE period. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main vari-
ables and the FRED-MD factors and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard
errors are calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is






























Figure C7. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normalization, during the entire period.
Sample period: 1990:2–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main variables and 4-month lags
of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the sample variances
computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the
95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 22, and the heteroscedasticity-robust






























Figure C8. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normalization, during the pre-TRACE pe-
riod. Sample period: 1990:2–2003:2. 12-month lags of the four main variables and 4-month
lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the sample variances
computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the
95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 15.6, and the heteroscedasticity-robust






























Figure C9. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, and the excess bond premium to a one-percent increase in the nominal policy
rate, estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-TRACE
period. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the four main variables and 4-
month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the sample
variances computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines
are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 13.1, and the heteroscedasticity-












































Figure C10. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the bid-ask spreads, and the inflation expecta-
tion, estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-TRACE pe-
riod. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the six main variables and 4-month
lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95%
confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 11.4, and the heteroscedasticity-robust












































Figure C11. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the bid-ask spreads, and the inflation expectation,
estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-
TRACE period. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the six main variables and
the FRED-MD factors and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are
calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 5.6, and












































Figure C12. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the bid-ask spreads, and the inflation expectation,
estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-TRACE period.
Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the six main variables and 4-month lags
of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the sample variances
computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the
95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 11.4, and the heteroscedasticity-robust












































Figure C13. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the trading volume, and the inflation expectation,
estimated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-TRACE period. Sam-
ple period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the six main variables and 4-month lags of the
instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedas-
tic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence













































Figure C14. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the trading volume, and the inflation expectation,
estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-
TRACE period. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the six main variables and
the FRED-MD factors and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard errors are
calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 5.5, and












































Figure C15. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the trading volume, and the inflation expectation,
estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-TRACE period.
Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the six main variables and 4-month lags
of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the sample variances
computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the
95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 13.8, and the heteroscedasticity-robust





































Figure C16. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the real loan rate, and the inflation expectation, es-
timated using LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-TRACE period. Sample
period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the five main variables and 4-month lags of the in-
strument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval.






































Figure C17. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the real loan rate, and the inflation expectation,
estimated using Factor-Augmented LP-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-
TRACE period. Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the five main variables
and the FRED-MD factors and 4-month lags of the instrument are included. Standard
errors are calculated using the Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is





































Figure C18. Response of the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate, industrial production,
inflation rate, the excess bond premium, the real loan rate, and the inflation expectation,
estimated using SVAR-IV with unit effect normalization, during the post-TRACE period.
Sample period: 2003:3–2016:12. 12-month lags of the five main variables and 4-month lags
of the instrument are included. Standard errors are calculated using the sample variances
computed from 1,000 draws from a parametric Gaussian bootstrap. Dashed lines are the
95% confidence interval. The first-stage F -statistic is 13.4, and the heteroscedasticity-robust
first-stage F -statistic is 19.4.
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